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COMMENTS 
Product Picketing-A New Loophole in Section 8(h) (4) 
of the National Labor Relations Act? 
Secondary pressure is that pressure resulting against the primary 
employer, with whom the union is trying to bargain, when a second-
ary employer, who has no direct concern in the labor dispute, is 
forced to cease dealing with the primary employer.1 A favored 
weapon used to exert secondary pressure is the secondary boycott, 
which historically has consisted of inducement of the employees of 
the secondary employer to engage in a work stoppage or of induce-
ment of the customers of the secondary employer to withhold their 
business.2 This comment is an examination of the latter of these 
techniques, with particular emphasis on picketing upon or near the 
premises of a neutral employer in order to appeal to consumers of 
the neutral to refrain from buying the neutral's products that were 
produced by the employer with which the union has a dispute. 
The relevant federal regulation of secondary activity is em-
bodied "in section 8(b)(4)(B)3 of the National Labor Relations Act.-t 
In general, clause (i) of 8(b)(4) prohibits, as an unfair labor practice, 
a union from inducing any individual employed by a neutral em-
ployer to refuse to handle goods or to strike against the neutral 
employer, and clause (ii) forbids a union from threatening or coerc-
ing the secondary employer directly, if in either case the union's 
object is to force the neutral employer to cease dealing with the 
primary employer. Although the language of section 8(b)(4)(B) is 
quite broad, a proviso to this section specifically exempts primary 
strikes and primary picketing from its proscription.I' Moreover, a 
1. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1950). 
2. See generally GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAw 120-27, 132-53 (2d rev. ed. 1958); 
Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 
MINN. L. REV. 257, 271 (1959). 
3. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1963). Section 8(b): 
"It shall be unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents 
" .•• (4)(i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by 
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to engage 
in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture, 
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, 
or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain 
any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce, where 
in either case an object thereof is 
" .•• (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, 
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, 
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any oilier per-
son ..... " 
4. Wagner Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), as amended, Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 141 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1958), as amended, Landrum-Griffin Act, 73 Stat. 542-43 
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. IV, 1963). 
5. Section 8(b)(4)(B): " .•. Provided, that nothing contained in this clause (B) 
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second proviso, the so-called "publicity proviso," protects publicity 
activities-other than picketing-by the union for the purpose of 
truthfully advising the public that products produced by its ad-
versary are distributed by another employer, so long as the publicity 
does not have an effect of inducing work stoppages on the premises 
of the neutral.6 When the proscription against activity that threatens 
or coerces an employer, clause (ii), was added by the Landrum-
Griffin amendments7 to the existing ban on secondary activity, most 
commentators assumed that all picketing at a secondary site was 
per se an unfair labor practice.8 A recent decision by the United 
States Supreme Court, NLRB v. Fruit &- Vegetable Packers &- Ware-
housemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),9 upsets these assumptions. 
I. THE Tree Fruits DECISION 
In Tree Fruits, contract negotiations between the Tree Fruits 
Labor Relations Committee, representing twenty-one fresh fruit 
packing and warehousing firms, and the Teamster's local, represent-
ing the employees of these firms, had broken down and an economic 
strike had resulted. The union subsequently organized a consumer 
boycott of the struck employer's products, and twenty-six Safeway 
food stores in Seattle, Washington were picketed by union mem-
bers carrying placards appealing to customers of Safeway not to 
purchase "Washington State" apples.10 The union also distributed 
handbills containing a more detailed message to the same effect. 
shall be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary 
strike or primary picketing .••. " . 
6. Section 8(b)(4): " .•• Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph 
(4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, 
other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, including 
consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products are 
produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute 
and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have 
the effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary 
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver or transport 
any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment ••• engaged in such 
distribution." (Emphasis added.) 
7. As a part of the 1959 amendments to the act, § 8(b)(4)(A) of the Taft-Hartley 
amendments, 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(A) (1958), became § 8(b)(4)(B). 
8. Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. 
L. REY, 1086, 1114 (1960); Cox, supra note 2, at 274; Farmer, The Status and Applica-
tion of the Secondary-Boycott and Hot Cargo Provisions, 48 GEo. L.J. 327, 341 (1959). 
But see Previant, The New Hot-Cargo and Secondary-Boycott Sections: A Critical 
Analysis, 48 GEO. L.J. 346, 353 (1959). 
9. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See Note, 
62 CoLUM, L. REv. 1336 (1962); Note, 1962 U. ILL, L.F. 672. See generally Note, 77 
HARV. L. REv. 361 (1963); Note, 47 MINN. L. REv. 109 (1962). 
10. The placards stated: "To the Consumer: Non-Union Washington State apples 
are being sold at this store. Please do not purchase such apples. Thank you. Teamsters 
Local 760, Yakima, Washington." 
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The union took definite steps to insure that the picketing was di-
rected only at the unfair product and not at Safeway generally. The 
pickets were instructed to make no statements to consumers that the 
retail stores were unfair and to make no requests of customers to re-
frain otherwise from patronizing the stores. The union, to avoid a 
violation of clause (i) of 8(b)(4), also successfully prevented a sympa-
thetic work stoppage by either the employees of Safeway or any 
other employees. Employee entrances to the Safeway stores were 
not picketed and union members patrolling the customer entrances 
were instructed to explain to Safeway's employees that the sole pur-
pose of the picketing was to enlist the support of consumers against 
their employer's product. The primary employer, Tree Fruits, filed 
charges against the union, alleging that the union had committed an 
unfair labor practice by threatening and coercing Safeway to 
cease purchasing Tree Fruits' apples in violation of clause (ii) of 
8(b)(4)(B). 
The NLRB, relying upon its earlier decision in Upholsterers 
Frame and Bedding Workers, 11 held that, under the literal wording 
of clause (ii) and the specific negation of picketing in the publicity 
proviso, consumer picketing in front of a secondary store was pro-
hibited per se because the natural and foreseeable result of such 
picketing, if successful, would be to force or require Safeway to 
reduce or discontinue altogether its purchases of such apples from 
the struck employers.12 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia set aside and remanded the Board's order.13 
Looking solely at the language of the statute, the court of appeals 
held that the most plausible reading was that clause (ii) of 8(b)(4) 
proscribed only conduct that in fact "threatens, coerces or re-
strains" the secondary employer.14 Thus, the court concluded that 
the Board had proceeded on the erroneous premise that the statute 
completely banned all consumer picketing and remanded to de-
termine whether there was any substantial economic injury to 
II. Upholsterers Workers, Local 61, 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), rev'd, 331 F.2d 561 
(8th Cir. 1964) (on authority of the Supreme Court holding in Tree Fruits); accord, 
New York Typographical Union No. 6, 141 N.L.R.B. 1209 (1963); Retail Store Union, 
Dist. 65, 141 N.L.R.B. 991 (1963); Teamsters Union, Local 445, 140 N.L.R.B. 1097 
(1963); Bedding Workers, Local 140, 140 N.L.R.B. 343 (1962); Plumbers Union, Local 
519, 137 N.L.R.B. 596 (1962); Blueprint Employees, Local 249, 135 N.L.R.B. 1090 
(1962); Int'I Typographical Union, Local 154, 135 N.L.R.B. 991 (1962); United Whole-
sale Employees, Local 261, 129 N.L.R.B. 1014 (1960), modified, 134 N.L.R.B. 931 (1961), 
enforced in pertinent part sub nom. Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963). 
12. Fruit &: Vegetable Packers, Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961). 
The Board also held that the picketing was not intended to induce Safeway's em-
ployees to take any kind of action; thus the picketing did not violate clause (i) of 
8(b)(4). 
13. Fruit and Vegetable Packers, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
14. Id. at 317. 
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Safeway which would support a finding of a threat or coercion.15 
The Supreme Court granted the NLRB's petition for certiorari. 
Although the Supreme Court, in a six-to-nvo decision, disagreed 
with the opinion of the court of appeals that the test was whether 
Safeway suffered actual economic loss, the order of the Board was 
vacated.16 The Supreme Court reasoned that the legislative history 
of the amendments to 8(b)(4) did not reflect, with requisite clarity, 
a congressional plan to prohibit all consumer picketing. The court 
distinguished between picketing directed solely at the product of 
the primary employer and picketing employed to persuade cus-
tomers not to trade at all with the secondary employer. Under a 
product boycott the secondary employer's purchases from the pri-
mary would be decreased only because the public demand for those 
goods has been diminished, while in a general consumer boycott 
the retailer is persuaded to cease business with the primary by pres-
sure designed to inflict injury on the secondary's business generally. 
Product picketing, thus analyzed, was held to fall outside the pro-
scriptions of section 8(b)(4)(B). 
A. Legislative History 
A fundamental concern with constitutional guarantees of free 
speech caused the Supreme Court in Tree Fruits to preface its 
analysis with the premise that a ban on peaceful picketing would 
not be ascribed to Congress unless it explicitly manifested a purpose 
to outlaw such picketing.17 A detailed examination of legislative 
history was conducted in search of the "isolated evils" intended to 
be proscribed by section 8(b)(4). The Court found no explicit state-
ment by any proponent of the bill that all secondary picketing was 
to be banned or, in particular, that picketing directed exclusively 
at a product was to be considered unfair. Rather, it was found that 
the proponents had made assertions typified by the following: 
"The amendment ... covers pressure in the form of dissuad-
ing customers from dealing with secondary employers. That re-
fers to establishing a picket line around a merchant's store, 
when the merchant handles the product of a company or of a 
manufacturing plant in which there is a strike. In other words, 
that is a form of coercion against an innocent employer, in an 
effort to compel the employer . . . to come to terms with the 
union."18 
15. Id. at 318. 
16. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964) Gustice Black 
concurring and Justices Harlan and Stewart dissenting). 
17. NLRB v. Drivers, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1960), 
18. 2 NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPoRTINC AND 
DISCLOSURE Acr OF 1959, at 1194 (1959) (Senator McClellan) [hereinafter cited as 2 
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Although it would be possible to read this statement as calling for 
a general ban on all secondary picketing, including product picket-
ing, the Supreme Court interpreted it as a specific statement of 
congressional intent that only picketing aimed at stopping all 
patronage of the neutral be banned. 
The Court's decision to allow some consumer picketing in the 
form of product picketing is questionable in view of the congres-
sional proponents' statements; it is even more difficult to support-
more specifically, a different meaning might be attributed to the 
proponent's statements-when certain statements of the members 
of the conference committee are examined. Senator Morse, illus-
trating with an example of product picketing substantially the 
same as that presented in Tree Fruits, stated that this type of 
picketing would be banned under the conference agreement.19 The 
Court, however, rejected Senator Morse's interpretation on the 
ground that he had refused to sign the agreement and opponents 
in their zeal to defeat a bill understandably tend to overstate its 
reach.20 Such an assumption is pure conjecture, and it seems as 
reasonable to assume that Senator Morse, as a participant in the 
committee's negotiations, would not at this late point in the 
debate risk an overstatement, which might be taken as reflecting 
the consensus of the committee, unless such a meaning was in 
fact what the committee intended. Furthermore, there is no evi-
dence of any other conferee disputing Senator Morse's assertion. 
The Board, in formulating its theory of a per se ban, had 
relied most heavily on a statement by Senator Kennedy summariz-
ing the purpose of the proviso. 
"[T]he Senate conferees insisted that the report secure the fol-
lowing rights: ... (c) The right to appeal to consumers by 
methods other than picketing asking them to refrain from buy-
ing goods made by nonunion labor and to refrain from trading 
with a retailer who sells such goods .... \Ve were not able to 
persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front of 
the secondary shop, but we were able to persuade them to agree 
LEGis. HIST.]; see generally 2 LEcxs. HIST, 1386 (Senator Goldwater); 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1615 
(Congressman Griffin). 
19. "It also makes it illegal for a union to 'coerce, or restrain.' This prohibits 
consumer picketing. What is consumer picketing? A shoe manufacturer sells his 
product through a department store. • • • The employees, in addition to picketing 
the manufacturer, also picket at the premises of the department store with a sign 
saying, 'Do not buy X shoes.' This is consumer picketing, an appeal to the public not 
to buy the product of a struck manufacturer.'' 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1426. 
20. Another opponent stated that under the amendment: "Unions can only ad• 
vertise against an establishment selling unfair goods. Picket lines are illegal where 
there is no primary dispute.'' 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1734 (Congressman Libonati). See also 
2 LEGxs. HIST. 1037 (Senator Humphrey). 
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that the union shall be free to conduct informational activity 
short of picketing."21 
Even without the aid of this history behind the publicity proviso, 
the Board had held that, in permitting appeals to consumers by 
methods other than picketing, the proviso manifested an intent to 
prohibit all consumer picketing.22 In the Board's view, Senator Ken-
nedy's summary simply reaffirmed this intent,23 indicating that the 
House bill as it existed before conference allowed no picketing and 
that the effort made in conference to relax this restriction was unsuc-
cessful, 2¼ although some publicity not involving picketing was to be 
allowed.25 The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation. The 
Court, emphasizing the word "and" in Senator Kennedy's state-
ment, held that it, in effect, meant it is permissible to ask consumers 
via picketing "to refrain from buying goods made by nonunion 
labor" so long as the union does not in addition ask the public 
to boycott the neutral. It would seem at least an equally plausible 
reading, however, that Senator Kennedy was listing two separate 
restrictions, the first explicitly prohibiting product picketing.26 In 
addition, other assertions are disclosed in the legislative history 
that also indicate product picketing was to be prohibited.27 
It is true, as the Court says, that Congress did not specifically 
recognize the distinction between product and general consumer 
picketing and that there was no statement explicitly prohibiting 
product picketing. The preponderance of the history, however, 
supports the Board's view that Congress did not wish to make any 
distinction in regard to consumer picketing, but rather such ac-
tivity was to be banned per se because all types of secondary picket-
ing necessarily coerce the neutral. 
21. 2 LEcIS. HIST. 1431-32 (Emphasis added.) 
22. See note ll supra and accompanying text. 
23. Upholsterers Workers, Local 61, 132 N.L.R.B. 40, 61 (1961), rev'd, 56 L.R.R.M. 
2164 (8th Cir. 1964). 
24. Id. at 61; Aaron, supra note 8, at lll4; Cox, supra note 2, at 274. 
25. Ibid. 
26. See note 27 infra. 
27. "Under the language of the conference report we agreed that there would not 
be picketing at a secondary site. What was permitted was the giving out of handbills 
or information through the radio, and so forth." 2 LEcIS. Hisr. 1389 (Senator Kennedy). 
The amendment " •.• prohibits secondary customer picketing at a retail store which 
happens to sell [a] product produced by [a] manufacturer with whom [the] union 
has [a] dispute." 2 LEcIS. HIST. 1712 (Analysis of the conference agreement by Congress-
man Griffin). "Employees will also be entitled to publicize, without picketing, the 
fact that a wholesaler or retailer sells goods of a company involved in a labor dispute. 
All appeals for a consumer boycott would have been barred by the House bill." 2 
LEcIS. HIST. 1720 (Analysis of the changes made in conference by Congressman Thomp-
son) (Emphasis added.); 2 LEcIS. HIST. 1706 (Congressman Thompson); 2 LECis. HIST. 
1437 (Senator Goldwater); note 19 supra. 
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B. The Primary-Secondary Dichotomy 
After determining the limited scope of section 8(b)(4), the Court 
turned to the question of whether the product picketing in Tree 
Fruits fell within the area of secondary consumer picketing that 
Congress clearly had indicated an intention to prohibit. The Court 
recognized that the effect of a product boycott on the neutral is a 
decrease in sales of the unfair product, and that such a decrease 
would result in a violation of the literal terms of clause (ii)(B) be-
cause the neutral would necessarily be forced to cease dealing with 
the primary employer to the extent of the decrease in his consumer 
sales of the products. Likewise, an appeal to cease buying a product 
is clearly an appeal to customers to cease dealing with the neutral, 
at least to the extent of the one product, thus violating the literal 
terms of the proponents' statements. The Court held, however, that 
upholding a ban on consumer picketing merely because it caused 
a decrease in consumer purchases violated the "spirit" of the stat-
ute. By picketing only the product, the union's appeal was confined, 
in 'a sense, to its dispute with the primary employer; thus, the 
union was just expanding the site of the primary dispute to the 
secondary premises. The Court contrasted this activity with picket-
ing to induce a general consumer boycott, which creates a separate 
dispute with the secondary employer. 
II. THE THEORY OF PRODUCT PICKETING AS "PRIMARY" ACTIVITY 
The Court, by introducing as a consideration the "primary" 
nature of the Tree Fruits picketing, raised the troublesome prob-
lem of distinguishing between primary and secondary activity, a 
distinction which is generally determinative of whether conduct 
falls within the proscriptions of 8(b)(4)(B).28 It has been said that 
the most stable element in the struggle with the problems pre-
sented by the primary-secondary dichotomy has been discord.29 The 
decision in Tree Fruits only adds to the confusion surrounding this 
dichotomy. The difficulties of distinction are compounded by the 
fact that the Court does not expressly label the picketing as primary 
activity, but merely analogizes it to that which is primary activity.30 
This is regrettable because what is needed in this area is a deeper 
examination of the theory involved in interpreting section 8(b)(4) 
28. The use of the term "secondary boycott" was originally adopted by the courts 
in applying § 8(b)(4)(B); it was only upon the adoption of the primary picketing 
proviso as pan of the 1959 amendments, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) 
(Supp. IV, 1963), that Congress explicitly recognized the primary-secondary dichotomy. 
29. Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 1363, 
1365 (1962). 
30. "[T)he Union's appeal is closely confined to the primary dispute." '!,77 U.S. at 
72. (Emphasis added.) 
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(B) and the development of a rationale to serve as a starting point 
both for the courts in presently applying the statute and for the 
legislature in drafting further secondary boycott legislation.31 At least 
one comprehensive attempt has been made, by Professor Howard 
Lesnick, to provide a rationale to explain and define the primary-
secondary dichotomy.32 Although Professor Lesnick limits his exam-
ination to the "common situs,"33 "roving situs,"34 and "reserved 
gate"35 problems, application of his rationale to consumer picket-
ing indicates that perhaps the Court's instinct in analogizing prod-
uct picketing to primary activity was theoretically correct. 
Professor Lesnick first states that one can not profitably analyze 
solely the effects on the neutral in a particular labor dispute be-
cause Congress has not considered harm to the neu_tral objectionable 
per se.86 On the contrary, Congress has given a wide latitude to the 
right to strike even though almost every strike causes economic 
loss to neutrals, and these losses from primary strikes far outweigh the 
usual losses caused by secondary activity.87 In addition, the inten-
tional infliction of harm on the neutral by the union does not neces-
sarily render the conduct secondary, for even in the traditional 
primary strike the union hopes that the secondary will put pres-
sure on the primary because of a disruption of the secondary's 
business caused by the shutdown or delay of the primary's pro-
duction.88 Nevertheless, the most important consideration in 
analyzing the primary-secondary dichotomy is the union's intent. 
The intent that is significant for Professor Lesnick, however, is the 
intent "to subject the secondary to pressure different in kind from 
that generated against him by a primary strike."39 More specifically, 
if a business is shut down by a primary strike, normal business re-
lations with the customers of that business are adversely affected, 
causing an economic loss to the secondary employer. Thus, while 
the secondary may or may not feel compelled because of his losses 
to try to persuade the primary to settle his dispute, the pressure 
generating the secondary employer's reaction "flows entirely from 
the disruption of the primary employer's business."40 However, 
31. "The dichotomy between primary and secondary activity is unquestionably 
the area of greatest difficulty and importance in the administration of the statute 
•..• " Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-Another Chap-
ter, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 125, 129 (1959). 
32. Lesnick, supra note 29. 
33. E.g., Sailor's Union, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950). 
34. E.g., International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 861, 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962). 
35. E.g., International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 761 v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 
(1961). 
36. Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1411. 
37. Tower, A Perspective on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAB. L.J. 727, 732 (1951). 
38. Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1412. 
39. Id. at 1412. (Emphasis added.) 
40. Id. at 1413. 
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when the primary union induces the neutral's employees to refuse 
to perform their jobs, the effect is one independent of consequences 
that normally results from a shutdown of the primary premises. As 
such it is "different in kind" and, therefore, secondary.41 
Applying this "different in kind" test to Tree Fruits, a theoreti-
cal basis for labeling product picketing as primary rather than sec-
ondary can be articulated. Most simply, the initial objective of a 
union's primary action against an employer who deals in goods is 
to prevent the sale of those goods, thus causing the employer, be-
cause of the economic injury, to capitulate to union demands. This 
may be accomplished by a strike causing a production slowdown or 
shut-down of the primary's plant; it may be accomplished by in-
ducing employees of the secondary to refuse to cross the picket line 
at the primary premises in order to pick up the goods; or it might 
be effected by roving situs picketing to induce the primary em-
ployees to refrain from unloading the goods at the secondary 
premises.42 Under the "effect different in kind" analysis, picketing 
to induce consumers to refrain from buying the product is merely 
another way of exerting direct pressure on the primary's business. 
The union, by labeling the product unfair, still attempts to prevent 
sale of the primary employer's goods, but the attempt is directed 
toward those persons and at that time and place where it would 
have the greatest effect-an appeal to the ultimate consumers of 
the goods and immediately prior to the potential sale. If the picket-
ing is successful, the retailer may be compelled for self-protection 
to cease stocking the primary employer's goods because there is no 
longer a market for them. However, the retailer would also have to 
stop handling the goods if the traditionally recognized primary action 
at the primary's premises had succeeded because then the goods 
41. An example of the application of this rationale is presented in the General 
Electric reserved gate decision. International Union of Elec. Workers, Local 761 v. 
NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (1961). The Supreme Court in this case held that an entrance to 
a plant reserved for neutral employees engaged in work on the neutral premises may 
be picketed but only when the employees are performing work unrelated to the 
normal operation of the plant. Applying Professor Lesnick's rationale, if the neutral 
employees' work were related to the normal operation of the plant, for example, main-
tenance work, closing of the primary plant would abrogate the need for the neutral's 
services, thus causing an economic loss to the neutral. Such a loss would be "primary" 
because it would flow directly from the disruption caused by the primary strike. 
Consequently, picketing a reserved gate through which such neutral employees pass 
would also be primary because its effect on the neutral employer would not be 
"different in kind" from a successful strike at the primary plant. On the other hand, 
if the work was unrelated, for example the neutral was a lessee on the premises, a 
disruption of the primary operation of the plant would have no impact on the neutral. 
Therefore, an appeal to the neutral's employees in this situation by picketing in front 
of their reserved gate would be "different in kind" and thus "secondary." For the 
application of this rationale to primary situs, common situs, and roving situs problems, 
see generally Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1411-30. 
42. See International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 861, 135 N.L.R.B. 250 (1962). 
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would be unattainable. On the other hand, if the picketing at the 
retailer's place of business goes beyond an effort to inform the 
public that a particular product sold by the secondary is being 
produced by an unfair employer and becomes an attempt to per-
suade the public to cease dealing generally with the secondary, the 
neutral would be subjected to a loss of business "different in kind" 
from that caused by successful primary action; closing the primary 
plant would have no effect on the retailer's general patronage except 
as it affected the primary product.43 
III. PossrnLE LIMITATIONS ON THE ScoPE OF Tree Fruits 
The rationale outlined above supports the Court's theory that 
product picketing is to be associated with primary activity. How-
ever, one of the principal difficulties presented by the Tree Fruits 
decision is that no specific damage was shown by Safeway, and, 
thus, the Court confined itself to a discussion of the theory of prod-
uct picketing. There are, however, a number of complications 
which may arise when a product is picketed. It is difficult to pre-
dict how the addition of facts other than those of Tree Fruits, when 
presented in future cases, will affect what on its face appears to be 
a broad and general sanction of product picketing. Nevertheless, 
it is of some benefit to examine these situations and the arguments 
that can be made toward limiting the apparently broad scope of 
Tree Fruits. 
One possible limitation on product picketing could be raised in 
situations where the picketing has some demonstrable effect on the 
secondary's general consumer patronage. It is doubtful that the 
only harm to Safeway from product picketing was a loss of 
sales of the primary product, regardless of the precautions taken 
by the union. It has often been recognized that a picket line sug-
gests a sort of psychological embargo around the picketed premises, 
43. A somewhat different analysis is suggested in the minority common-law cases, 
footnoted by the court, which recognize the product boycott-general consumer boycott 
distinction. The leading case is Goldfinger v. Feintuch, 276 N.Y. 281, 11 N.E.2d 910 
(1937), which allowed product picketing at a delicatessen serving meat produced by 
an employer with which the union had a dispute. The New York court in upholding 
the picketing suggested that a "unity of interest" was created between the retailer 
and the manufacturer on the theory that, since the unfair manufacturer pays less than 
union wages, both it and the retailer who sells the product are in a position to under-
sell competitors. Or as another court stated it, the one who sells the product of a 
primary becomes an ally by providing an outlet for the unfair product. Fortenbury 
v. Superior Ct., 16 Cal. 2d 405, 106 P.2d 411 (1940). Carrying this to the extreme, it 
would seem that this theory would justify coercion including a general consumer 
boycott. The common-law courts following Goldfinger, however, have universally 
applied the same distinction as the Supreme Court applied in Tree Fruits by denying 
the union the right to picket the secondary employer to persuade the public to with-
draw its patronage generally. The fact that this distinction is made would indicate 
that underlying considerations for the common-law rule are those outlined in the text. 
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depending for its persuasiveness on the associations most people 
have in mind when they think of picketing,44 thus inducing action 
"quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dis-
seminated."45 Therefore, the product picketing may very well have 
the "signal" effect of causing many members of the public to cease 
patronizing Safeway entirely, thereby achieving the effect of a 
general consumer boycott against a secondary employer. As a mini-
mum, a picket line will tend to harm Safeway's goodwill and public 
image since anyone glancing at a picketed Safeway store is likely to 
assume that Safeway itself is being branded as unfair. 46 
In Tree Fruits, the only effect on Safeway attributed to product 
picketing by the Court was a loss in sales of the primary product. 
However, the Court also stated that picketing "requesting the pub-
lic to not trade at all with the neutral" would be coercive within 
the proscriptions of 8(b)(4) because it would cause a general con-
sumer boycott. But the opinion does not make clear the effect a 
showing of actual economic loss would have upon the lawfulness of 
the product picketing. Arguably, therefore, if the effect of a general 
consumer boycott were shown to have resulted from product picket-
ing, the picketing could constitute coercion of the neutral in viola-
tion of section 8(b)(4). On the other hand, since product picketing 
has now been held valid, perhaps it would be unjust to deprive the 
union of the right to product picket because of incidental effects 
the union is powerless to prevent beyond taking the precautions 
utilized in Tree Fruits.41 Furthermore, a limitation requiring evi-
dence of a neutral's general consumer patronage loss would create 
a morass of administrative difficulties. The proof necessary to show 
the damage, and the degree of damage which must be shown, would 
be difficult standards to formulize.48 Both the neutral and the union 
44. See note 45 infra. 
45. Bakery &: Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942) (con-
curring opinion by Justice Douglas). Picketing " ••. establishes a locus in quo that 
has far more potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets 
convey ••.. " Building Serv. Employees v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532, 537 (1950); Hughes 
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Teamsters Union v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284 (1957). 
46. "To a loyal unionist it is both a spontaneous plea not to engage in any 
business activity with those behind the picket curtain and an instantaneous branding 
of 'unfairness' on those engaged in activity behind the picket line," Superior Derrick 
Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1960). 
47. Professor Lesnick's solution to the problem of adverse incidental effects differ-
ent in kind is to allow the picketing to the extent that such effects do not occur. 
In the common and roving situs cases, where picketing at secondary premises is 
allowed, there is often the danger, in preserving the right to primary action, that the 
secondary's employees will be induced to refuse to cross the picket line. Professor 
Lesnick argues, although it is not clear that it is the law, that the picketing union 
should be responsible to see that secondary employees are not so induced, feeling that 
the union in most cases is in a position to prevent it. Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1429. 
48. See the criticism of the circuit court's holding in Tree Fruits, which required 
a showing of economic loss, in Burr v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612, 620 (1963). 
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have legitimate interests to protect in this situation, and it would 
be difficult to predict without a specific factual situation which 
argument will prevail. It should be noted, however, that an actual 
general consumer patronage loss will seldom arise because it is 
doubtful that most neutrals would be willing to suffer the necessary 
damage in order to test the scope of Tree Fruits. Rather, they will 
be inclined to cease dealing with the primary simply upon the 
threat of picketing.49 
A second possible limitation of the Tree Fruits holding is sug-
gested by Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent.50 Justice Harlan argued that 
the majority's distinction is tenuous if the picketed retailer de-
pends largely or entirely on sales of the struck product.51 For ex-
ample, if an independent gas station mvner purchases gasoline from 
a struck fi.rm,52 arguably he would be as injured by picketing 
that appeals to his consumers to refrain from buying his gasoline 
because it originated from an unfair source as by picketing that ap-
peals to his consumers to refrain entirely from patronizing his gas 
station. If the product picketing is successful in this situation it will 
result in a virtual shutdown of the neutral's business. In Tree 
Fruits, the Court's only basis for holding that a decrease in con-
sumer sales caused by product picketing does not violate the literal 
terms of the statute is that such an interpretation is not within the 
"spirit" of the statute, seemingly because the harm to Safeway 
would be minimal. If it could be shown that the retailer is suffering 
substantial economic losses, perhaps the picketing should be barred, 
since the major concern of Congress in prohibiting secondary ac-
tivity was a concern over the burdens imposed on neutrals by such 
activity.58 However, if Tree Fruits were so limited, again the prob-
lem of determining the degree of harm that must be shown would 
pose difficulties. More importantly, such a limitation would not be 
consistent with the apparent theory of product picketing that it 
is primary activity, and thus activity which the union should have 
available to appeal to the public. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
equities in each particular factual situation are likely to control 
the decision of whether the "one product" neutral should be pro-
tected makes it difficult again to predict to what extent Tree Fruits 
may be so limited. 
A third possible limitation on the Tree Fruits sanction of 
product picketing arises from an assumption stated earlier that 
most neutrals will cease dealing with the primary upon the mere 
49. See text accompanying notes 55-61 infra. 
50. 377 U.S. at 80. 
51. Id. at 83. 
52. An example of such a factual situation at common law was Alliance Auto 
Serv., Inc. v. Cohen, 341 Pa. 283, 19 A.2d 152 (1941). 
53. E.g., 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1615. 
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threat of product picketing. That a neutral does, in fact, frequently 
so react is supported by a significant number of Board decisions. 
The NLRB in deciding Tree Fruits, because of the lack of evidence 
of economic harm, was limited to a finding that the "natural and 
foreseeable result" of the Tree Fruits product picketing was to 
coerce and restrain the neutral.54 In other cases involving product 
picketing, however, the Board has found that when the union ap-
proached a neutral and threatened to picket unless he acceded to 
its demands, the retailer ceased selling the product rather than 
face a picket line.55 In addition, upon the threats of picketing by 
the union, neutrals have removed the products from public dis-
play, 56 refused to accept goods already ordered, 57 refused to order 
more goods, 58 and ceased advertising the goods. 59 These cases pro-
vided the NLRB with enough evidence to hold not only that co-
ercion of the neutral was the natural and foreseeable result of 
product picketing, but also that such coercion was, in fact, the re-
sult. 60 The reasons in these cases for the neutrals' decision to cease 
dealing entirely rather than to have their premises picketed were 
not expressly set out. Presumably, however, it was because of the 
fear of the concomitant adverse effects previously suggested. 
The Supreme Court in sanctioning product picketing said, "if 
the appeal succeeds, the secondary employers' purchases from the 
struck firms are decreased only because the public has diminished 
its purchases of the struck product."61 The Court also said a viola-
tion of 8(b)(4) would not occur if the neutral dropped the product 
as a poor seller because the picketing was successful in reducing 
the neutral's sales of the product. The Court, however, seemingly 
because it failed to consider the signal aspects of all picketing-
including product picketing-did not say whether evidence that a 
neutral had ceased business with the primary upon the threat 
of picketing would have any effect on the validity of product picket-
ing. Therefore, it is possible such a showing would result in a 
limitation on Tree Fruits' sanction of product picketing. Despite 
the Court's language, the probability of the union doing significant 
damage to its adversary by appeals to the public through a product 
54. 132 N.L.R.B. 1172, 1177 (1961). 
55. Teamsters Union, Local 445, 140 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1099 (1963); Bedding Workers, 
Local 140, 140 N.L.R.B. 343, 357-58 (1963); Blueprint Employees, Local 249, 135 
N.L.R.B. 1090, 1094-95 (1962). 
56. Teamsters Union, Local 445, supra note 55, at 1100; Bedding ·workers, Local 
140, supra note 55, at 357-58. 
57. Ibid. 
58. Ibid. 
59. Bedding Workers, Local 140, supra note 55, at 357-58. 
60. Cases cited note 55 supra. 
61. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964). (Emphasis 
added.) 
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picket is slight when compared with the pressure the union can 
exert on the primary through the secondary. The latter's desire to 
avoid threatened product picketing at his premises will cause him 
to cease dealing with the primary employer or to attempt to per-
suade the primary employer to settle the labor dispute. Significantly, 
the union would thereby engender the neutral's aid simply by 
threat, without ever having to persuade the public to aid the union 
voluntarily. 
There are, however, considerations which militate persua-
sively against a limitation on the Tree Fruits sanction of product 
picketing when the neutral reacts to a threat of product picketing. 
First, a complete business cessation by the secondary with the 
primary does not do violence to the theory explaining the primary-
secondary dichotomy outlined above, because a total cessation could 
also be the result of traditionally recognized primary activity. 
Second, establishing such a limitation on the Tree Fruits holding 
would be almost entirely for the benefit of the primary employer, 
since the choices open to the neutral remain the same. However, 
Congress in drafting section 8(b)(4) evidenced no concern for the 
effects of secondary activity on the primary employer. Third, the 
proposed limitation would seemingly allow the creation of a union 
unfair labor practice at the whim of the neutral employer. It would 
be difficult to guard against collusion between the neutral and the 
struck employer whereby the neutral would engage in a sham busi-
ness cessation, undertaken only for the purpose of ridding itself 
of the pickets and lasting only until a section IO(l) injunction of 
the picketing is ordered. Finally, there is some possibility that the 
recent Servette case could be used as authority to uphold the 
union's use of a threat of a product picket to apply secondary 
pressure. 62 
62. Section 10(1) of the act allows an injunction to be issued as soon as there is 
reasonable cause to believe an 8(b)(4)(B) violation has been committed. 73 Stat. 544 
(1959), 29 U.S.C. § 169(1) (Supp. IV, 1963). 
Arguably, a logical extension of the Supreme Court's recent holding in NLRB v. 
Servette, Inc., 377 U.S. 46 (1964), precludes a limitation on the right to product picket 
based upon a showing that cessation resulted from a threat to picket. Servette involved 
a union threat to pass out handbills appealing to consumers to refrain from buying an 
unfair primary product at the secondary retail store. One question presented in 
Servette was whether a threat to handbill made to the managers of the stores was an 
inducement of "an individual employed by any person" in violation of clause (i) of 
section 8(b)(4)(B). The Court held that there was no violation because the 
warning by the union of its intent to handbill was an appeal for the exercise of 
managerial discretion, rather than an appeal to employees, and, therefore, not an 
illegal inducement. In addition, the Court found no violation of clause (ii) of section 
8(b)(4)(B); the Court held handbilling protected by the publicity proviso and, a 
fortiori, that the threat to handbill, which was the situation in Servette, should also be 
protected. Arguably, a general rule could be inferred from this later holding that if 
the union's proposed conduct, whether handbilling or product picketing, is recog-
nized as legal, reaction by the neutral's management, who will generally be the 
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IV. SUMMARY 
Although there are possible ways of finding a middle ground to 
control the extent of the right to product picket, it is doubtful 
that any significant curb on this right will be made by the Board 
or courts in view of the present state of the law and the difficulties 
that would attach to any limitation. Whether the Supreme Court's 
sanction of product picketing in Tree Fruits should stand will 
ultimately have to be faced by Congress. Professor Lesnick's ration-
ale has initial validity in determining theoretically whether the 
picketing in question is primary or secondary. It must be recog-
nized, however, that when the union's actions are based on "follow-
ing the unfair product," the probability of undesirable secondary 
effects flowing from the theoretically primary action may outweigh 
the advantages provided the union in allowing it a right to product 
picket. At this point Congress might well decide to prohibit the 
activity because of its adverse secondary effects even though it might 
be called primary under Professor Lesnick's test. Even if Congress 
does not take this step, it is possible the courts will conduct a deeper 
analysis of secondary activity and conclude that when the secondary 
effects of union activity become dominant, the union will be pre-
sumed to intend such effects, and, because such effects are different 
in kind from those the neutral would experience under more tradi-
tional primary activity, such activity might yet be categorized as 
secondary. 
A helpful analogy is suggested by clause (i) of 8(b)(4), prohibit-
ing a union's inducement of the employees of the neutral.03 If the 
theory of product picketing as primary activity is that the primary 
dispute is to a limited degree expanded to the secondary premises 
by following the unfair goods, this same reasoning should allow 
the union to induce the employees of the neutral to cease handling 
the primary goods.64 If the secondary employees were to cease 
recipient of the threat, to a threat to engage in the conduct will not impair the 
validity of the conduct. Perhaps, however, threats to picket should be distinguished 
from threats to handbill because of a possible difference between the two in the 
reasonableness of the neutral's fear of secondary effects. It may reasonably be assumed 
that in the situation where a mere threat of picketing or handbilling causes the 
neutral to cease dealing with the union's adversary the only explanation for the 
neutral's business cessation is a fear of the secondary (incidental) effects of the 
picketing or handbilling, since the neutral's lost sales of the product resulting from 
a product boycott could only approach but never surpass the impact of a voluntary 
business cessation with the primary. It is the fear of a loss of general consumer patron• 
age or goodwill which prompts the neutral, not actual losses in the sales of the 
products. See text accompanying notes 44-46 supra. Thus, because of the "signal" 
aspect of picketing, not present to substantial degree in handbilling, the retailer may 
be more justified in fearing a loss of general patronage. 
63. 73 Stat. 449 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV, 1963), quoted note 
3 supra. 
64. Professor Lesnick recognized that this consideration complicated his rationale 
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dealing with the goods, thus preventing their sale, this in itself 
would not be pressure different in kind from primary action pre-
venting the goods from reaching the neutral's premises in the first 
place. However, a union inducement of employees to refuse to 
work with the goods of another employer is generally prohibited by 
clause (i) of section 8 (b) (4).615 Seemingly, the reason for banning 
this theoretically primary activity in clause (i) of the statute is 
that the secondary effects are no longer incidental, but have become 
dominant. If the employees of a retailer could refuse to handle 
every unfair product that passes through a retail store, it would 
cause considerable disruption of the retailer's operation, and it 
seems unfair to the neutral to incite workers satisfied with their 
a,;vn conditions.66 Similarly, the probability of product picketing 
signaling a general consumer boycott may be deemed such a domi-
nant secondary effect as to call for a ban on the activity. 
The problem demands not only examination of the secondary 
effects of picketing but also examination of the alternative methods 
of publicizing a labor dispute, such as handbilling and advertising, 
currently protected by the publicity proviso.07 The strongest argu· 
ment in favor of the use of product picketing is that the public 
traditionally associates "picketing" with a labor dispute.68 Thus, 
picketing, because it instantly signals a labor dispute, distinguishes 
this kind of union plea from other types of publicity campaigns, 
including those which utilize handbilling and advertising.69 & 
previously noted, however, picketing is likely to signal the public 
that the employer being picketed is unfair to labor in addition to 
the more generalized notification of the existence of a labor dis-
pute. 70 By limiting the union appeals to informational activity short 
of picketing, the appeal to consumers to honor the "picket line" 
does not arise. Conceivably, under a product picketing ban the 
consistent use of handbilling may eventually come to signal a labor 
dispute; however, instead of also signaling that the neutral is un--
fair, handbilling would signal a product boycott and union sym-
pathizers would readily accept and read the leaflets. Thus, hand-
billing could approach the effectiveness of picketing as a method of 
informing the public that the neutral is selling a product produced 
and thus to avoid the problem of "following the product," he modified his rule. 
Lesnick, supra note 29, at 1414. 
65. An exception to this generalization is presented in the reserved gate situation, 
see note 41 supra. 
66. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ar::r, 1947, at 1107 
(1948) (Senator Taft). 
67. 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (Supp. IV, 1963), quoted note 6 supra. 
68. See generally 2 LEGIS. HIST. 1427 (Senator Morse). Hellerstein, Secondary Boy• 
cotts in Labor Disputes, 47 YALE L.J. 341, 350 (1938). 
69. Ibid. 
70. See notes 44-46 supra and accompanying text. 
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by the union's adversary.71 If product picketing continues to be 
sanctioned, in order to prevent the effects of a general consumer 
boycott, the public must be educated in the distinction between 
picketing directed at the product and picketing directed at the 
neutral employer. Arguably, however, it would be easier to limit 
product boycotts to handbilling and to educate consumers that 
handbilling signals a product boycott than it would be to continue 
a right to product picket and teach the public to govern its reaction 
by the message on the placard and not by the fact of picketing itself. 
Since picketing involves an element of free speech, when a 
congressional ban on picketing is contemplated, first amendment 
guarantees must be considered. Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring 
opinion in Tree Fruits, disagreed with the majority and argued that 
Congress did intend a per se ban on consumer picketing and that 
such a prohibition was unconstitutional.72 Justice Black recognized 
that picketing is sometimes more than free speech because of 
its signal nature in inducing action irrespective of the ideas 
attempted to be communicated and, thus, is sometimes subject to 
regulation. He argued, however, that Congress' ban on consumer 
picketing did not manifest any concern with picketing itself, 
but rather the ban seemed intended only to "prevent dissemination 
of information about the facts of a labor dispute .... " 73 How-
ever, a congressional ban on product picketing expressly based on 
the danger that the signal nature of picketing will cause a general 
consumer boycott, the prospect that other methods of publicity may 
be as effective as picketing, and the administrative difficulties in-
herent in any middle ground approach of permitting some but not 
all product picketing would seem to satisfy Mr. Justice Black's first 
71. This would present the issue of distinguishing between handbilling and 
picketing. There is no authority giving precise definitions of either of these terms. 
Traditionally, however, picketing suggests patrolling with placards while handbilling 
suggests a more or less stationary distribution of leaflets. There has been only one case 
decided in which handbilling took on a characteristic of picketing. Service Employees, 
Local 399 (Bums Detective Agency), 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962). In this case the union 
was held to have threatened and coerced a secondary employer in violation of clause 
(ii) of § 8(b)(4) when twenty to seventy union members patrolled in an elliptical 
path in front of the main entrance of a sports arena, some passing out handbills but 
none carrying placards. Two members of the Board held expressly that this conduct 
was picketing. Two other members declined to decide the question of whether the 
activity was picketing but merely held that this was not the traditional means of 
handbilling and therefore not protected by the publicity proviso. Although nothing 
conclusive is indicated by the Bums case, it would seem that the proper test in the 
secondary boycott area for distinguishing picketing from handbilling is whether the 
conduct is likely to have the signal aspect of labeling the neutral as unfair. Thus, 
whether the "handbilling" is accompanied by patrolling or the carrying or posting 
of signs of any sort and the number of union members present are all factors to 
consider. 
72. 377 U.S. at 76. 
73. Id. at 78. 
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amendment objections and to be supported by existing case author-
ity upholding proscriptions on the right to picket.74 
Michael A. Warner 
74. See cases cited note 45 supra. 
